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In a real-effort laboratory experiment to manipulate evasion opportunities, we study 
whether the moral evaluation of tax evasion is subject to a self-serving bias. We find 
that tax morale is egoistically biased: Subjects with the opportunity to evade taxes judge 
tax evasion as less unethical as opposed to those who cannot evade. The detection 
probability does not affect this result. Further, we do not find moral spillover effects, for 
example, on legal activities. 
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1. Introduction 
Is morally right what benefits oneself? We analyze if moral evaluations of tax evasion 
are egoistically biased. Several researchers have emphasized the importance of tax 
morale in explaining observed tax evasion (e.g., Baldry 1986, Cummings et al. 2009). 
Tax morale is a special form of solidarity behavior with a low level of social interaction 
and interpersonal coordination (Brosig-Koch et al. 2011). It is often described as the 
intrinsic willingness to pay taxes (Alm and Torgler 2006, Russo 2013). 
Typically, tax morale is assumed to arise independently of the individuals’ economic 
situation. For example, there is almost no evidence of self-serving bias in Dahl and 
Ransom’s (1999) survey of Mormon Church members about their voluntary 
contributions to the church. The authors, thus, conclude that subjects are able to separate 
out their own self-interest when forming ethical beliefs. The results might not be 
generalizable because religiousness is positively correlated with tax morale (Torgler 
2006). In contrast, Blanthorne and Kaplan (2008) find evidence that “high-opportunity” 
taxpayers (business owners and earners of cash income without third-party reporting) 
judge underreporting as less unethical compared to “low-opportunity” taxpayers (all 
others). This result indicates that tax morale is subject to a self-serving bias. However, 
the authors’ result might suffer from sample selection: Taxpayers with low tax morale 
can self-select into high-opportunity occupations. 
It is, therefore, empirically unclear whether tax morale arises independently of 
individuals’ economic situation or whether there is self-serving bias. In a real-effort lab 
experiment with a diverse subject pool and high variance in tax morale, we randomize 
subjects to treatments with and without tax minimization opportunities, to avoid sample 
selection bias. We demonstrate empirically that individuals’ tax morale is subject to a 
self-serving bias. Individuals with the opportunity to evade taxes consider tax evasion 
less unethical compared to those without this opportunity. Our results are robust to 
different detection probabilities and economically similar but licit avoidance 
opportunities. We also find no spillover effects of evasion opportunities on other moral 
evaluations (e.g., bribery or lying). 
2. Hypothesis Development 
Previous tax compliance research often assumes that subjects’ tax morale arises 
independently from economic considerations (Wenzel 2004). However, the construct 
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tax morale itself could be affected by subjects’ economic environment. Psychological 
research indicates that peoples’ fairness perceptions are influenced by self-serving bias. 
Subjects rate outcomes as fair if they benefit from the outcome (Messick and Sentis 
1979). People like to think of themselves as honest (Mazar et al. 2008). One way to 
maintain a positive self-view is rationalization, an important determinant of fraud in 
criminology. Another way to maintain a positive self-view is to adjust (unconsciously) 
one’s own moral evaluation of a specific deviant act, for example, tax evasion. 
Individuals can then reduce any cognitive dissonance from differences between moral 
attitude and actual behavior (Festinger 1957). The observed result would be an 
egocentric interpretation of tax morale (self-serving bias). Accordingly, we formulate 
our hypothesis as follows. 
Hypothesis: The individual’s opportunity to evade taxes decreases tax morale. 
3. Experimental Design 
We randomly assigned the subjects, 187 students of the XXX University, to one of three 
treatments (between-subject design). In all treatments, subjects were offered the same 
real effort task. Subjects had to key in paper test sheets from a modified multiple-choice 
test. The gross wage was 10 ECU (1 ECU = 0.07€) per correctly recorded sheet. After a 
training period, subjects chose the number of sheets to key in (between zero and 48). 
This labor supply decision was binding: Each subject had to key in the stated amount of 
sheets to receive the remuneration above the show-up fee of 5€. All subjects provided 
the self-determined level of labor supply. 
Earned income was subject to progressive taxation. Subjects were informed that tax 
revenues increased the budget of the business school at the XXX University. The first 
four sheets were tax exempt, the fifth (and subsequent) sheet was taxed at a marginal tax 
rate of 30%, and the 29th (and subsequent) sheet was taxed at 65%. 
Treatments differed only in the opportunity to evade taxes. In the No Opportunity 
treatment, subjects could not reduce their tax burden by tax evasion. In the Safe 
Opportunity as well as the Risky Opportunity treatments, subjects were instructed that 
they could illegally reduce their tax burden through tax evasion. Simultaneously with 
their labor supply decision, subjects could choose their level of tax evasion, with a 
maximum tax base reduction of six sheets. Subjects in the Safe Opportunity (Risky 
Opportunity) treatment were informed that tax evasion would not be detected (would be 
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detected with a probability of 25% and that subjects would have to pay the evaded tax 
and a penalty of 50% of the evaded tax upon detection). 
After subjects made their labor supply decisions and, in the two opportunity treatments, 
their tax evasion decisions, we asked them about their moral evaluations of five 
situations: 
• Claiming state benefits to which one is not entitled, 
• Cheating on taxes if one had the chance, 
• Lying in one’s own interest, 
• Accepting a bribe in the course of one’s duties, 
• Avoiding taxes by using legal means if given the chance. 
The first four questions were taken from the 2008 European Values Survey. Since the 
European Values Study does not include a question about legal tax avoidance, we 
adapted the formulation from the tax evasion question. Subjects indicated on a Likert 
scale from one (“never justified”) to 10 (“always justified”) how they evaluated each 
situation. To simplify interpretation, we recoded the variables by subtracting the 
answers from 11, such that a value of 10 (one) implies a high (low) morale. 
In line with previous research (Alm and Torgler 2006, Doerrenberg and Peichl 2013), 
we use the answer to the tax evasion question as a measure of tax morale. The other four 
moral variables are used to study if evasion opportunity triggers a spillover effect on the 
moral evaluation of other activities. The experiment was programmed and conducted 
with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). After having completed a post-
experimental questionnaire and having provided their labor supply, participants were 
remunerated in cash. On average, they received 19.07€ (SD = 4.28€). The average 
duration of the experiment was 1 hour and 50 minutes. 
4. Results 
4.1 Tax Morale 
Figure 1 presents average tax morale for all three treatments. In the No Opportunity 
treatment subjects, average tax morale is 8.15. Having evasion opportunities reduces tax 
morale to 7.41 (Safe Opportunity) and 7.34 (Risky Opportunity), respectively. The 
differences between No Opportunity treatment and each other treatment are significant 
(Safe Opportunity, p=0.069; Risky Opportunity, p=0.049, Mann–Whitney U-tests). This 
result is in line with our hypothesis: Subjects’ tax morale is egocentrically biased and 
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negatively affected by their own evasion opportunities. This holds for both riskless and 
safe evasion opportunities. We observe no significant difference between safe and risky 
opportunity treatments (p=0.902, Mann–Whitney U-test). All results hold if we control 
for sociodemographic variables such as gender, age, income, and study major in ordered 
probit models.1 
 
Figure 1: Average tax morale, measured on a 10-point-Likert scale (1 = low morale, 10 = high morale). 
4.2  (No) Spillover Effects 
Research on moral spillover shows that events that violate one’s own moral standards 
can increase one’s deviant behavior in other areas (e.g., Mullen and Nadler 2008, 
Cornelissen et al. 2013). These observations suggest that introducing evasion 
opportunities could affect moral evaluations of other “misdoings.” Table 1 displays the 
results of subjects’ moral evaluations for the No Opportunity treatment and the two 
treatments with evasion. We aggregate the Safe Opportunity and Risky Opportunity 
treatments, since there are no significant differences between them. However, we do not 
find any evidence for a spillover effect. Thus, subjects only adjust their tax morale but 
do not alter other moral values. 
  
                                                 
1 The results are available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 1: Evasion Opportunity and Moral Evaluations 
 No Opportunity 
(N=60) 




 Mean Median SD Mean Median SD p-values 
Tax Morale 8.15 9.00 1.94 7.38 8.00 2.28 0.029 
Claiming unjustified subsidies 8.08 9.00 2.00 8.06 8.00 2.00 0.902 
Lying 6.15 6.00 2.18 6.04 6.00 2.48 0.712 
Bribery 8.73 9.00 2.01 8.36 9.00 2.23 0.375 
Tax avoidance 2.90 2.00 2.41 2.65 1.00 2.46 0.204 
This table displays tax morale and other moral evaluations measured on a 10-point Likert scale (1 = low 
morale, 10 = high morale). The p-values are based on a Mann–Whitney U-test. 
 
4.3 Robustness 
One concern about our setting is that the No Opportunity and opportunity treatments 
differ in the actual tax burden. The fact that subjects can exploit tax evasion 
opportunities to reduce the tax burden might cause differences in observed tax morale. 
To control for this potential bias, we run two additional treatments with legal tax 
avoidance opportunities. These are equivalent to the safe and risky evasion 
opportunities, but we frame the tax reduction opportunity as a “legal tax loophole.” We 
find an average tax morale of 8.43 (8.37) in the safe (risky) avoidance opportunity 
treatment. This value is significantly larger than the tax morale observed in the 
corresponding evasion treatments (p=0.002 in both comparisons, Mann–Whitney U-
test) but not significantly different from the No Opportunity treatment (p=0.184 and 
p=0.236, respectively, Mann–Whitney U-test). Thus, we also observe a self-serving bias 
if we compare evasion opportunity treatments with economically equivalent avoidance 
opportunity treatments. 
5. Conclusion 
The present paper shows that moral evaluations of tax evasion are subject to a self-
serving bias. Individuals with an evasion opportunity judge tax evasion as less 
unethical. We find no evidence for a spillover effect on moral evaluations of other 
misdoings. Our results suggest that the effect of moral appeals by policy makers on 
reducing tax evasion may not be as effective as expected due to self-serving bias. 
Moreover, our results might help explain why previous studies find lower tax morale 
among self-employed individuals (Alm and Torgler 2006). These are typically 
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